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THE LAW SCHOOL
Several changes in the Faculty appear at the opening of the present
session. Herschel W. Arant, who has been Assistant Professor of Law
for two years, resigned on July first to become Dean of the University
of Kansas School of Law. Although he will be much missed, his many
friends cannot but congratulate him upon his call to a position which
offers unusual opportunities to advance the cause of legal education in
the progressive state of Kansas.
Much of Professor Arant's work will be taken over by Karl Nicker-
son Llewellyn, who has been appointed Assistant Professor of Law.
Mr. Llewellyn received from Yale the degrees of B.A. in 1915, LL.B.
in 1918, and J.D. in 1920. He served as instructor in the Yale Law
School during the academic year i919-2o. Since that time, he has been
engaged in the practice of law in New York City. His record as a
student and an instructor justifies the prediction of a successful teach-
ing career for him. Professor Llewellyn's courses will be Bills and
Notes, Persons, Sales, and Labor Law.
Walter Wheeler Cook, Professor of Law at Columbia University for
the past three years, has returned to Yale. Professor Cook received
from Columbia University the degrees of B.A. in 1894, M.A. in 1899,
and LL.M. in i9oi. He has been engaged in law teaching for twenty-
one years and is recognized as one of the most scholarly and successful
teachers in the profession. He taught at Yale from 1916 until i919 and
his return to the Yale Faculty is a cause for congratulation by all friends
of the School. Professor Cook's subjects will be the Equity courses
and Common Law Pleading.
With these exceptions the personnel of the Faculty remains unchanged.
Several changes in the curriculum, however, should be mentioned.
Professor Vance will offer a course in State Insurance and Professor
Corbin will give a course in Legal Analysis. Judge Gager's death,
which was "recorded in the June issue, has left open the courses in Mort-
gages and Legal History. The former will be given by Professor
Thurston; the latter by Assistant Professor Woodbine, who has during
the summer prepared a series of cases, so that Legal History will be
taught by the case method. The course in Public Service Law will
be taught by Professor Clark, and Professor Borchard will teach Admin-
istrative Law.
The enrolment continues to show a slight increase, two hundred and
thirty-four students, exclusive of those from other departments of the
University, having registered up to this time. A comparison of the
registration this year and last year is given below:
1921-1922 1922-1923
Graduate Class .................... 3 10
Third Year Class .................. 72 73
Second Year Class ................. 62 8i
COMMENTS
First Year Class ................... 78 72
Students from other departments of the
University ..................... 47 40
Total ..................... 262 276
The decrease in the number of college seniors registered in the Law
School is due to the new requirement that academic students taking the
combined course shall devote their entire time during the fourth year
to law courses.
During the 1922 Summer Session seventy-seven students registered for
the first term and eighty for the second term, the total number for
the summer being one hundred and fifty-seven. Eight completed the
course and have been recommended for their degrees. The Session was
divided into two terms of five weeks each. ,Criminal Law, Property I,
Evidence, Public Service Law, Suretyship, Equity III, and Municipal
Corporations were offered during the summer. Professor W. L. Sum-
mers, of the University of Illinois Law School, taught Criminal Law,
and the course in Municipal Corporations was taught by Professor W.
A. Sturges, of the University of South Dakota Law School. The
other courses were taught by the regular members of the Law Faculty.
In the Law School this year, eighty-one colleges and universities are
represented, as follows: Yale University, 84; Holy Cross College, 9;
University of Minnesota, 5; Harvard University, Trinity College, Cath-
olic University, Clark University, Wesleyan University, University of
Kansas, 4; University of Virginia, University of Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania State College, University of California, Columbia University,
Smith College, Barnard College, Syracuse University, Princeton Uni-
versity, 3; Baylor University, University of Vermont, Dartmouth
College, University of Wisconsin, Cornell University, University of
Pennsylvania, Brown University, George Washington University, Bos-
ton College, Georgetown University, Notre Dame University, Vassar
College, United States Military Academy, Hunter College, University
of Illinois, University of Indiana, Ohio State University, Wellesley
College, Ursinus College, 2; Radcliffe College, Columbia College, Val-
paraiso University, University of Texas, Nova Scotia Technical College,
Randolph-Macon College, Fisk University, University of Missouri,
University of Kentucky, Mercer University, University of Cincinnati,
Mount Holyoke College, Saint Bonaventure College, Latran University
(P. I.), Virginia Military Institute, Lehigh University, Georgia School
of Technology, Washburn College, Pennsylvania Military College,
Saint Mary's University, Pomona College, Rutgers College, Connecti-
cut College, William Jewell College, Hamilton College, University of
San Marcos, University of West Virginia, Muhlerberg College, Bates
College, University of Oklahoma, University of Nebraska, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Washington and Jefferson University, Kenyon
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College, University of Michigan, University of Arkansas, North Ameri-
can College (Italy), Niagara University, Muskingum College, Lincoln
University, Vanderbilt University, Colby College, Oberlin College, Uni-
versity of Mississippi, I.
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-SEPARABLE LIMITATIONS
It is a long settled rule that a gift not separated by the donor will not
be separated by the courts in order to save it from the rule against per-
petuities. Thus if a politically-minded testator should devise his real
estate to John for life with remainder in fee to the first son of John who
should be elected to Congress, but if John should have no such son, then
the estate to go to the testator's daughter, Sarah, in fee, the gift to Sarah
would be void for remoteness, even though John should die without
ever having had any son at all. ' Sarah's gift would have been saved if
the testator had been thoughtful enough to separate the contingencies,
and had said that Sarah was to have it if none of John's sons was elected.
to Congress or if John had no sons. But since the testator had not done
this, it is settled that the courts will not do it for him. Jessel, M. R.,2
thought the rule "purely technical," but for all that it still flourishes in
the United States as well as in England, its ancient home.3  There has,
however, grown up an interesting exception to this rule in case of
bequests of future interests in personalty. Suppose the testator
bequeaths, family plate and portraits to his son John for life, with
successive remainders in tail to the first and other sons of John, and then,
in default of such issue of John, to Sarah. Here it is manifest that
John's issue may fail at the time of his death by his then having7 no issue
at all, or it may fail at some remote time in the future in case he leaves
a son. Since the subject of this gift is personalty, the first vested donee
in tail takes the entire property, and the gift over to Sarah must be a
mere executory interest and not a vested remainder. Therefore, under
the general rule, Sarah's gift would be void even though John died a
bachelor. And such was the earlier holding.4  After much fluctuation
of opinion 5 the House of Lords in 176o6 held it valid when the persons
who were to take the prior absolute interests never came into existence;
that is, the limitation N as split to save the gift. And this has ever since
been settled law. But even so, the rule that personalty settled after the
'Proctor v. Bishop of Bath & We7ls (1794, C. P.) 2 H. B1. 358.
'Miles v. Harford (1879) L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 691, 704.
'See Kales, Future Interests (2d ed. 192o) sec. 685; Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.
1915) sec. 350 et seq.
"Burgess v. Burgess (1674) 1 Ch. Cas. 229, I Mod. 1I5.,
'Compare Higgins v. Dowler (1707) I P. Wins. 98, 2 Vern. 6oo, and Stanley v.
Leigh (1732) 2 P. Wins. 686 (holding such a gift good), with Clare v. Clare
(1734) Cas. Temp. Talbot, 21, and Brett v. Sawbridge (1736, H. L.) 4 Bro. P. C.
244, I Eng. Rep. 123o (declaring it to be too remote).
'Pelhain v. Gregory (176o, H. L.) 5 Bro. P. C. 435.
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mode of realty vests absolutely in the first donee in esse to whom the
gift has been described with words, such as would create a fee tail in
realty, with a consequent failure of all limitations over, has proved most
embarrassing to settlors who wished to make sure that chattels of family
interest, like portraits and plate, should remain in possession of the suc-
cessive owners of the family landed estates. In the effort to accomplish
this natural desire of testators, conveyancers in England have been accus-
tomed to place such personalty in trust to be held and enjoyed in the same
manner as settled land "so far as the rules of law and equity will per-
mit." This phrase was a direct invitation to the courts which they could
not be expected to decline. There has been much litigation7 with the
net result that each successive life tenant of the realty takes a,possessory
right to the chattels for life, until an estate in the land vests in right
(although not necessarily in possession) in an existing tenant in tail,
when the trust in the personalty is executed. Such tenant in tail then
becomes the absolute owner of the chattels, subject, of course, to the pos-
sessory right of any prior life tenant of the.realty who may be living,
unless the language of the settlement clearly makes possession of the
realty a condition of ownership of the chattels, in which event the trust
remains executory. The Court of Appeal held 8 that in such a settle-
ment of personalty for the use of "the person or persons who for the
time being shall be entitled to the said mansion house," such a condition
was expressed with sufficient clearness. This decision has been much
criticized, although never overruled.9
The rule and its application have recently come up for debate and
decision in the House of Lords in the interesting case of Portman v.
Portman.Y Here, in effect, was a testamentary trust of chattels, "to go
and be held so far as the rules of law and equity will permit with the Man-
sion House called Buxted Park as heirlooms,"- to be held and enjoyed
accordingly in succession by the several persons who shall be respectively
entitled for the time being to hold and enjoy the said Mansion House."
The land referred to was settled in substance as follows: to A for life,
with remainder for life to the first son of A, who should be born in the
settlor's lifetime, and not be entitled to the Barony of Portman, with
remainders in tail successively to the other sons of A. Then was added
the proviso that if any of A's issue should become entitled to said Barony
in possession, the estate should go over as if he had died without issue.
" Gray, op. cit. secs. 365, 366, where the cases are cited with comment.
'Ii re Lord Chesham's Settlement [i9og] :2 Ch. 329, adopting the construction
placed upon the same instrument by Mr. Justice Chitty. In re Lord Chesham's
Settlement (1886) L. R. 31 Ch. Div. 466.
'See the remarks of Lord Chancellor Birkenhead in the case of Portman v.
Portman (1922, H. L,) 38 T. L. R. 887, 890.
"0 Supra note 9.
Of course, calling them heirlooms doesn't make them so. See Gray, op. cit.
see. 363, note 3.
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Under this settlement, upon A's death in 1899, her second son came
into possession of the Mansion House and chattels. In 1903 a daughter,
the Hon. Selina Lusie, was born to him. According to the rule above
stated, this honorable infant became at once vested with an estate tail
in the Mansion House, expectant upon her father's life estate, and sub-
ject to be divested by the subsequent birth of a brother, and thereby
absolutely entitled to the chattels, likewise subject to divestment upon
the advent of a brother. No brother arrived, but the Hon. Selina's
father did succeed to the Barony in 1919, and she at once lost her vested
interest in the Mansion House by the operation of the proviso which
carried to the third son of A, the Hon. Claud, an estate tail in possession
in the realty. This shifting clause did not violate the rule against per-
petuities as far as the real estate was concerned, for it is well settled that
a conditional limitation that must take effect, if at all, during the continu-
ance of an estate tail, does not violate the rule, since the power of the
tenant in tail to destroy all future interests by barring the entail places
the entire estate unconditionally under his control.1 2
The third son, having been confirmed in his possession of the Mansion
House by a decree of the Court of Chancery," insisted that he was
entitled to have also the "heirlooms" which the settlor so evidently
intended to remain in the Mansion House. But the intention of the
testator, however clear to the lay reader, and the hopes of the third son,
now tenant of the Mansion House, were alike doomed to defeat, for the
House of Lords, affirming the order of the Court of Appeal,14 which, in
turn, had approved the decree of the Chancery Division,1 5 held, (i)
that there was nothing in the language of the settlement to prevent the
operation of the general rule that settled chattels vest in the first tenant
in tail in esse, whether in possession of the realty or not; and (2) that
the proviso which had shifted the realty to the third son, did not disturb
the Hon. Selina in her ownership, or her father, the now Viscount, in
his possession of the personalty, because the proviso, although perfectly
valid as to the realty, for the reason stated, was void for remoteness as
to the personalty. This latter conclusion is necessarily correct if the
limitations of the personalty be regarded as a single gift, for the shift
might easily take place much more than twenty-one years after lives in
being at the settlor's d6ath, and there is no such thing as barring an
entail in personalty. But, it may be asked, if the court will split the gift
as originally made for the sake of the Hon. Selina, why will it not now
split it for the sake of the Hon. Claud? It is obvious that, as the event
occurred, the shift can take place within lives in being; and if the gift
'See Gray, op cit. sec. 443 et seq.; i Jarman, Wills (6th ed. 1910) 321, 322;
Carr v. Erroll (1805) 6 East, 58; Portnzan v. Portman [1921, C. A.] 2 Ch. 491,
505.
"In re Harcourt [1920] I Ch. 492.
,[1921] 2 Ch. 491.
[1921] i Ch. 187.
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over can be separated into one which should take effect in case the first
son of A to take the Mansion House should succeed to the Barony
(which happened), and another in case any succeeding tenant should
attain to that honor, it is clear that the gift over could be saved, and the
testator's purpose given effect. But after the brief suspension of activ-
ity that saved the gift to the Hon. Selina, the general rule came again
into its own. The courts will not separate gifts for donors. The
Lord Chancellor distinguished Harrington v. Harrington0 upon which
counsel for the Hon. Claud relied, and the family plate and portraits of
the Harcourts passed from the Harcourt Mansion into the present pos-
session of Viscount Portman and the ultimate disposition of the Hon.
Selina, always assuming that no baby brother intervenes. Such is the
perfect work of a rule of construction allowed to play the part of a rule
of law.
-W. R. V.
THE CORONADO COAL CASE
In these times of great industrial unrest, when disagreement between
capital and labor seems to be the order of the day, every movement in
the direction of remedial settlement of fundamental differences assumes
proportions of unusual interest. While legislatures have been character-
istically sluggish in their efforts, it is stimulating to note that the courts,
to the limited extent that they can, are dealing with the question in a
,courageous and straightforward manner. An excellent example of such
judicial courage is the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of the United Mine Workers of America v.
Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 570. Among other points of
great moment to labor, that case held,' that a labor union was a legal
entity so that it could be sued in its union name and that its funds
accumulated to be expended in conducting strikes were subject to exe-
cution in suits for torts committed by such a union in the course of a
strike.
At common law, only a natural or artificial person could sue or be sued.
A corporation, therefore, being a legal entity, distinct and apart from the
individuals who composed it, was considered as endowed with that
attribute of artificial personality which permitted it to sue and be sued.
2
This power to bring suit and the liability to judgment in suits brought
(1871) L. R. 5 H. L. 87.
'Although this holding was not absolutely necessary to the decision, nevertheless
it is clear that the court intended to decide this issue before passing to the other
issues involved. It should be borne in mind also, that this holding, even if it is
considered part of the decision, is in theory binding only on the federal courts
and that as far as the state courts are concerned, it is merely persuasive.
I Cook, Corporations (7th ed. 1913) sec. i. For our present purposes it is not
necessary to analyze or discuss this legal fiction of an "entity."
3
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by others were withheld at common law from that class of associations
of individuals known in our law as voluntary unincorporated associa-
tions. 3  To this latter class trade unions belong, and hence the well
established rule that a trade union is not a legal entity for the purposes
of being sued and bringing suit: A trade union, as such, distinct from
the individuals that composed it, was a pure myth, so far as being
endowed with legal rights and duties was concerned. The proper man-
ner in which to proceed against such associations was by going after the
individual members.4 It is clear, therefore, that the question of suabil-
ity of labor unions is, in essence, a procedural one. Should a labor
union, for example, incur a debt through one of its officers or members
duly acting for the union, it was well settled at common law that no
action in contract could be maintained against the union in its association
character for, the recovery of that debt.5 Recovery could be had only
against the individual who actually made the contract, or against the
individual members of the union who conferred power upon the acting
agent, all of whom must normally be named as defendants. In some
states, statutes have been passed providing that actions may be brought
by and against an unincorporated association in the names of specified
officers.6 Then too, the equitable doctrine of parties by representation,
embodied in almost all codes, that when the question is one of a common
or general interest to many persons, or where the parties are very numer-
ous and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all, is applicable in actions
against voluntary unincorporated associations.7  As between the mem-
bers of such an association and a creditor, each individual member is
liable for the entire debt." If the "union fund" can be reached at all, it
can be reached only as the joint property of the members, who are really
joint tenants of all the association property, and not as the property of a
'Wrightington, Unincorporated Associaiions (1gi6) sec. 70; Karges Fur-
niture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union (1905) 165 Ind. 421,
75 N. E. 877; Pickett v. Walsh (19o6) 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753; Baskins v.
United Mine Workers (1921) 15o Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464; COMMENTS (1921) 31
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-'Wrightington, Unincorporated Associations (1916) sec. 70; Dicey, Parties To
An Action (2d ed. 1886) 169, rule 20; 5 C. J. sec. l02, n. 5,; Baskins v. United
Mine Workers, supra note 3.
'In an article on the Coronado case appearing in The New Republic for August
16, 1922, the author proceeds on the assumption that a trade union could be sued
in contract at common law as a legal entity for a debt incurred by it. It is sub-
mtted that such an assumption was erroneous. See supra notes 3 and 4.
'N. Y. C. P. A. secs. 12, 13; Ostrom v. Greene (19oo) i6i N. Y. 353, 55 N. E.
919; Ein City Club v. Howes (1898) 92 Me. 211, 42 At. 392.
Story, Equity Pleading (8th ed. 1870) secs. 94, 97; St. Germain v. Bakery
Union (1917) 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665; Branson v. I. W. W. (19o8) 30 Nev.
270, 95 Pac. 354.
'Nolan v. McNainee (1914) 82 Wash. 585, 144 Pac. 9o4.
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distinct legal entity known by the union name.9 In other words, the
union funds, like all other property, belong not to the union, as such,
but to the individual members who compose it.10 In suits against the
individual members their joint union funds can be reached on execution,
just as their separate and individual property can be, but only such
portion of those funds as belongs to the individual members who can be
proved to have authorized the acts for which the suit is brought. It
is clear, therefore, that it was impossible, at common law, to hold the
union to a group responsibility, and it was this disability that has at
various periods given rise to movements looking toward compelling the
incorporation of these bodies. Appreciating the effect that such legis-
lation would have upon the peculiar immunity from group responsibility
that labor unions have enjoyed, these attempts have been successfully
repelled. Although there may be some doubt as to the advisability of
requiring incorporation, it seems that the balance is in favor of such a
requirement and that the matter is well worthy of prompt legislative
attention. Statutes have already been passed in several jurisdictions
providing in substance that where several individuals form themselves
into a voluntary unincorporated association known by some distinguish-
ing name, such association may sue. or be sued by that name." These
statutes have been held not to deprive a plaintiff of the rights he previ-
ously had at common law; for the individuals comprising such associa-
tions do not thereby acquire any immunity from individual liability, and
it is optional with a creditor to sue either the association as such, or the
individuals composing it."? On the other hand, statutes have been passed
in a few jurisdictions expressly codifying the common-law rule to the
effect that unincorporated associations may not bring an action in the
association name.
13
In this state of the law, it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible,
'Ahlendorf v. Barkous (1898) 20 Ind. App. 657, 50 N. E. 887; Torrey v. Baker
(1861, Mass.) I Allen, i2o; Parks v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (191o) 137 App.
Div. 719, 122 N. Y. Supp. 521; Branagan v. Bucknan (igio, Sup. Ct) 67 Misc.
242, 122 N. Y. Supp. 61o.
"Curtis v. Hoyt (1848) ig Conn. 154; see Grand Lodge v. Reba (1922) 97
Conn. 235, 116 Atl. 235.
UConn. Gen. Sts. 1918, ch. 293, sec. 5611; Huth v. Humboldt (1891) 61 Conn.
227, 23 Atl. 1084; Davison v. Holden (887) 55 Conn. 1O3, 1O At. 515; Detroit
Lt. Gd. Band v. First Mich. Inf. (1903) 134 Mich. 598, 96 N. W. 934; U. S.
Heater Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union (1902) 129 Mich. 354, 88 N. W. 889.
"Davison v. Holden, supra note Ii; U. S. Heater Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union,
supra note ii. The labor unions should observe that by incorporation they may
gain an advantageous. limitation of individual liability.
" In Ohio and Nebraska, an unincorporated association cannot sue in the
associate name, unless it is organized to carry on some trade or business in the
state or to hold property. St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union
(9o5) 94 Minn. 351, lO2 N. W. 725; Cleland v. Anderson (1902) 66 Neb. 252,
92 N. W. 3o6.
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to uphold the decision as'to the suability of labor unions on common-
law principles. The court was itself conscious of that fact and reached
its decision in the face of existing precedents to the contrary. In so
doing, it did what has been done repeatedly in the past and will continue
to be done by courts in the future; that is, it legislated judicially. 4
However much the advisability of the court's resorting to judicial
legislation as the medium through which to reach its final decision may
be doubted, there can be little if any doubt that the end sought and
attained, namely, a group responsibility for the wrongful acts of com-
binations as powerful as labor unions, was a most desirable one."6
To deny the existence of labor unions as legal entities for purposes of
accountability for obligations assumed and wrongs committed by them,
and in the same breath to recognize them as such for purposes of receiv-
ing privileges under various legislative acts,16 is neither more nor less
than permitting such associations, through proper agents, to enjoy all
the advantageous rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of the law
without bearing the burdensome duties, disabilities, no-rights, and liabil-
ities that other persons are compelled to endure. There is no reason in
logic or policy why such highly organized bodies, controlling so much
wealth, so many human beings, and so freely engaging in all phases of
business activity should be immune from' a group responsibility for
contractual and tort obligations. The difficulty to be surmounted is
almost wholly a procedural one; and since procedure is a means to an
end and not an end in itself, procedural difficulties should not be per-
mitted to stand in the way of effectively dealing with powerful com-
binations of 'individuals when obvious rules of policy demand the
contrary.' 7
Although from a strictly legal point of view, the particular question
under consideration was purely procedural, yet the political element
inseparably'connected with it magnified the problem considerably. It is
"
4It is only fair to state that the court was influenced in reaching its result by
an interpretation of several acts of Congress, believed by the court to have altered
the common law piecemeal. See United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado
Coal Co. (1922) 42 Sup. Ct 570, 576.
1 5Albertsworth, Leading Developments in Procedural Reform (1922) 7 CoRN.
L. QUART. 332.
' See supra note 14.
'* The members of a labor union or other unincorporated association already
have the unlimited individual liabilities of partners for the acts of union agents
acting with their actual or ostensible authority. As stated above, each individual
member's share in the joint fund can be reached, provided only he is made a party
defendant. The method of making him such a party is purely a procedural matter.
The problem becomes more than procedural only when the substantive jural rela-
tions of the union members are changed. The court has not yet determined,
however, that the whole union fund can be seized for the acts of any individual
member, including the share of those members who have never actually or
ostensibly authorized the acts. Such a determination would raise questions of
policy requiring separate discussion.
. COMMENTS
the presence of this political aspect that has cast a slight doubt upon the
wisdom of the Supreme Court's assuming to pass upon so delicate a ques-
tion which legislatures have steadfastly sidetracked. For a court to
legislate judicially upon a political question of such vital importance to
so large a percentage of the population is daring conduct, even though
it reaches its result by inference from several statutes passed for other
purposes. Whether it was wise policy to strike down with one mighty
stroke an immunity which the labor unions have enjoyed and to which
they have considered themselves entitled since the Clayton Acte, is
another question. There is no denying that it has engendered further
hostility toward the court, which has manifested itself in bitter criticism.
Would it have been better if the courts had assumed a "hands-off" policy
and had left the problem for solution to the legislature? There" is
doubtless much merit in the contention that this whole question was one
rather for legislative action than for judicial decision. The Supreme
Court, however, thought differently and chose to face the matter frankly
and courageously. Despite differences of opinion as to the manner of
approach to the goal attained, it is the goal, after all, that is the more
important factor to be considered. Were the court to hesitate to act
on admittedly legal questions merely because vital political and economic
issues were also involved, many questions of great moment both to
labor and capital on the one hand, and to the public at large on the
other, would remain suspended and unsettled, much to the detriment of
all concerned. 9
If it is agreed that labor unions ought to be held to a group respon-
sibility, the question in a given case ought not to be whether the union
as such should be responsible in contract or in tort, but whether the
particular promises or acts alleged constituted a binding contract or a
tort, as the case may be. In this latter regard, the instant decision clearly
contains what may well be characterized dangerous inferences as to the
chargeability of unions for acts of individual members or groups of
members. Let us suppose that a union, whose membership runs into the
tens of thousands, orders a strike. During the course of the strike,
fifty odd members commit acts of lawlessness resulting in damage to
the plaintiff's property. Should the union, as an entity, be held respon-
sible for the damage done? Should the tens of thousands of other
members, in their group character, be made insurers for the good con-
duct of every individual member? Though the decision did not squarely
answer that query in the affirmative, it clearly left room for a positive
inference in that direction. It is submitted that to impose such an
insurer's liability on labor unions would be decidedly out of harmony
with the spirit of the Clayton Act and would be doing violence to justice.
The fact must be recognized that in movements of large bodies of men
'Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat, at L. 730), U. S. Comp. Sts. 1916, sec. 8835f.
SCOM -ENTS (1921) 31 YAL-E LAW JOURNAL, 86.
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struggling for what they conceive to be their just rights, some lawlessness
is bound to creep in. Common experience has taught that. Unless such
lawless conduct can clearly and unequivocally be laid to the union either
by proving a direct authority to commit such acts or by so manifest a
ratification or silent acquiescence as can leave no room for doubt, the
union ought not to be held responsible for it. In brief, the same degrees
of proof should as well be required in establishing the liability of labor
unions as is required in establishing that of corporations and natural
persons. The ordinary rules of agency should apply and no insurer's
liability should be imposed. To hold otherwise would be an obvious
attempt to deprive labor of the only effective weapon it has for purposes
of self-defense and self-advancement; for it is plain that the result would
be the ultimate elimination of the strike and the overthrow of trade
unions. It is well to remember that, as yet, the Supreme Court has not
definitely passed upon the question and it is hoped that no such position
will be taken.
Labor generally has looked upon the decision as one of the greatest
set-backs it has ever suffered. Much has been heard to the effect that
it was merely one more victory for the so-called "privileged classes."
The best answer to such ridiculous implications is the fact that the
decision was a unanimous one. That in itself is a conclusive indication
of absolute good faith. Labor men have already begun to realize that the
decision may not only not be a set-back, but possibly a gain to labor.
2 0
It is true that the decision necessarily implies that labor unions are legal
entities as well .for the purpose of bringing suit as for being sued. It
'might be added that with this bestowal of legal capacity on labor unions,
one of the principal grounds upon which courts have in the past granted
injunctions was rendered far less effective; namely, the argument of
inadequacy of the legal remedy based on the fact that unions were not
On June 20, 1922, there appeared editorially in the United Mine Workers'
Journal, the official organ of the union coal miners, the following: "If a labor
union can be sued, as was decided by the United States Supreme Court in the
Coronado case, then it can also sue. If a labor union can sue, then there
is no good reason why it should not utilize the law and the courts for the
protection of itself and its members and its welfare against oppression,
damage, and outrage. If the law and the courts afford a means by which
union-busting employers may harass, torment and oppress unions and the
working people, then unions and working people should not hesitate to use the same
weapons against that class of employers. Coal operators secure injunctions to
prevent strikes. Labor unions could secure injunctions to prevent lock-outs. Num-
erous coal companies have sued the union for heavy damages for things that hap-
pened during strikes. Unions could sue such employers for damages for things
they do to their employees. Without any legal right whatever, some employers
evict families of working men from their homes and set them and their household
goods out upon the roadside to be destroyed by rain and weather.' Who will say.
that damage suits could not be filed against such employers under such circum-
stances ?"
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liable in money damages for the harm done to property, which it was the
purpose of the injunction to prevent.
The development of this question in England is interesting. In the
leading case on the point, Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Ry.
Servants,2" it was held that a trade union could be sued in its registered
name and its funds were amenable to actions in tort for damages occa-
sioned by acts of its members. The result was-a greater participation by
labor in politics with a coincident growth in a class consciousness among
laborers. Within five years after the Taff Vale decision, the labor
party secured the passage of the Trade Disputes Act of 19o6,2 -2 which
largely nullified the effect of that decision.23 It may be that the Cor-
onado decision will have a similar effect in this country, though such a
consequence is quite unlikely, for class consciousness among laborers
here is as yet not strong enough. It has been suggested, and wisely, that
"how to deal with the causes underlying these conflicts is the real ques-
tion confronting law no less than labor, and not the recognition by law
of the reality of trade unions." 24
EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURES IN LAND SALES
Suppose that A and B enter into an executory contract for the sale
of land in which payments are to be made in instalments. By express
stipulation time is declared to be "of the essence," and a condition is
inserted that upon the vendee's default to make a payment, all sums
previously paid are to be considered as forfeited. If A pays but a small
portion of the purchase price and then defaults, or pays all but one
hundred dollars of the total amount and then fails to pay an instalment,
will equity afford relief in either situation under the doctrine that equity
abhors a forfeiture?
Generally, in the case of a contract for the sale of land, equity will
not treat time as of the essence, but will permit one who has suffered the
time for payment to elapse to pay after the prescribed date and compel
a performance by the other party notvithstanding his own delay; pro-
vided, of course, that equitable grounds for relief exist and that the
delay has occasioned no undue hardship on the other party.' Where,
however, one of the parties defaults upon the date set, if no forfeiture
'[igoi] A. C. 426.
(i9o6) 6 Edw. vii, ch. 47.
i Br. Rul. Cas. 832, n. I.
' The New Republic, supra 'note 5
'Parkin v. Thorold (1852, Ch.) 16 Beav. 59; Sylvester v. Born (i89o) 132 Pa.
467, i9 AtI. 337; Diamond v. Shriver (i91I) 114 Md. 643, 8o AtI. 217; King
v. Connors (I915) 222 Mass 26x1 nio N. E. 289; Robberson v. Clark (1913) 173
Mo. App. 301, i58 S. W. 854; Robinson v. Collier (9o9) 53 Tex. Civ. App. 285,
115 S. W. 915; Dillon v. Ringleman (i916) 55 Okla. 331, 155 Pac. 563; Quinn
v. Roath (1870) 37 Conn. I6; Raymnond v. San Gabriel C . (1893, C. C. A. 8th)
53 Fed. 883; McLean v. Windham Light Co. (1912) 85 Vt. 167, 8I AtI. 613.
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is involved, the other, being invested with a power to change the terms of
the contract,2 may make time of the essence by giving notice.3
Time may also be of the essence by implication or construction of law
when from its very nature the value of the subject matter necessarily
fluctuates with the mere lapse of time.- And finally it may be expressly
stipulated by the parties that time shall be of the essence. No particular
clause is necessary, but any statement will have that effect which clearly
provides that the contract shall be null and void if not fufilled within the
proper time.5 Where such stipulation exists, many courts adopt a most
stringent rule. The recent case of Rafferty v. Gaston (1922, Wash.)
204 Pac. 595, following what seems to be the weight of authority in
this country, 6 held that a vendee, under such a contract, who has
defaulted in payment without the consent or acquiescence of the vendor,
" The notice served must be reasonable, the length of time allowed depending upon
the circumstances of each individual case. Harding v. Olson, infra note 3 (42
days) ; Pluamner v. Kennington (igio) 149 Iowa, 419, 128 N. W. 552 (one month) ;
Garrison v. Newton (97) 96 Wash. 284, 165 Pac. go (one and one-half months);
Carroll v. Mundy (1989) 185 Iowa, 527, 17o N. W. 790.
'Parkin v. Thorold, supra note I; Burchfield v. Hageman (1915) 35 S. D. 147,
'151 N. W. 47; Moore's Estate (i8gg) 191 Pa. 6oo, 43 Atl. 474; Harding v. Olson
(898) 177 Ill. 298, 52 N. E. 482; Schmnidt v. Reed (1897) i32 N. Y. io8, 30
N. E. 373; Clarno v. Grayson (1896) 30 Or. 111, 46 Pac. 426; Grigg v. Landis
(1868) i9 N. J. Eq. 350.
'Mackey Wall Plaster Co. v. U. S. Gypsum Co. (917 D. Mont.) 244 Fed.
275; Bennie v. Becker-Franz Co. (913) 14 Ariz. 58o, 134 Pac. 28o; Hardy
v. Ward (89o9) 15o N. C. 385, 64 S. E. 171; Acne Building Co. v. Mitchell
(1916) 129 Md. 406, 99 Atl. 545; Taylor v. Longworth (840, U. S.) 14 Pet. 872;
Ky. Distilleries Co. v. Warwick Co. (igoi, C. C. A. 6th) 1O9 Fed. 280.
'Ellis v. Bryant (19o4) 12o Ga. 89o, 48 S. E. 352; Garci v. Furniture Co.
(9o5) 186 Mass. 405, 71 N. E. 793; Cadwell v. Smith (9o9) 83 Neb. 567, 120
N. W. 130; Collins v. Delaney Co. (19o6) 71 N. J. Eq. 32o, 64 Atl. io7.
'Heckard v. Sayre (1864) 34 Ill. 142; Jones v. Farns Co. (97) 116 Miss.
295, 76 So. 88o; Hurley v. Anicker (915) 5, Okla. 97, 15, Pac. 593; Skookum
Oil Co. v. Thonas (1912) 162 Calif. 539, 123 Pac. 363; Nelson Real Estate Agency
v. Seelnan (1920) 147 Minn. 354, i8o N. W. 227; Suburban Homes Co. v. North
(1914) 5o Mont. io8, 145. Pac. 2; Vito v. Birkel (19o4) 209 Pa. 2o6, 54 Atl.
i27; True v. Northern Pac. Ry. (1914) 126 Minn. 72, 147 N. W. 948; Moss v.
Rubinstein (I92I, Sup. Ct.) 117 Misc. 385, 899 N. Y. Supp. 496; Wensler v. Tilke
(igi6) 97 Kan. 567, 155 Pac. 946; Schwerin Realty Co. v. Slye (1916) 173 Calif.
170, 159 Pac. 420; Claremore Co. v. Burke (igi6) 56 Okla. 169, 155 Pac. 897;
Fratt v. Daniel-Jones Co. (1913) 47 Mont. 487, 133 Pac. 7oo; Papesh v. Wagnon
(1916) 29 Idaho, 93, 157 Pac. 775; Keefe v. Fairfield (19o3) 184 Mass. 334, 68
N. E. 342 (even though the vendor accepted payments fron the vendee after
default). In several states there are statutes prohibiting clauses of forfeiture, but
the provision is construed to apply only where unusual grounds are presented for
equitable relief, which the vendee must prove to the satisfaction of the court.
Barnes v. Clement (i8g) 12 S. D. 270, 81 N. W. 301; Cook-Reynolds Co. v.
Chipnan (8983) 47 Mont 289, 133 Pac. 694- In Oklahoma, where such a statute
also exists, the court came to the conclusion that by inserting the clause in the
contract the parties were equally guilty, and hence that the law would help neither
of them to recover either the money or the land. Kershaw v. Hurtt (8917, Okla.)
168 Pac. 202.
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can neither recover the amount already paid, nor obtain specific
performance.
7
No real hardship is caused by the forfeiture if the consideration
already paid upon the contract is small as compared with the purchase
price. In such cases courts of equity have no difficulty in determining
that the parties intended such sum (usually the first payment) either as
a deposit or as earnest-money to bind the bargain, or as liquidated
damages.8 But where only one or two small instalments of the pur-
chase price are still to be paid.before the vendee is entitled to a deed,
it seems obviously unjust to deprive the vendee of both his money and
his land, in view of the fact that he has certain equities in the land which
must be fully recognized. The analogy of a vendee to the common-law
mortgagor may be of assistance in reaching a more equitable result.
At common law, upon the granting of a mortgage, the legal title to the
land becomes vested, subject to a condition subsequent, in the mortgagee,
who retains it as security for the payment of the debt.9 The beneficial
or equitable interest, however, is in the mortgagor, who is treated in
equity as the owner of the land. Upon the principle of treating as done
everything which ought to be done, equity regards the interest of the
mortgagor not as a mere chose in action, but as property, as an estate,
subject to the lien created by the mortgage. The analogy of the vendee
to such mortgagor is striking. It is generally held that where there is
an executory contract for the sale of realty, the vendee becomes in equity
the owner of the land, in conformity with the maxim above mentioned.
The vendor is said to retain the legal title as security for the payment
of the purchase money until the final conveyance.' To such an extent
The vendee had been accustomed to pay in advance, usually giving the vendor
a lump sum amounting in excess of his $25 monthly payments, and having it
applied to these payments as they fell due. The last payment, together with all
prior ones, became used up, so that the vendee was in arrears in his payments and
interest in the sum of $iio. Thereupon the vendor sold the land to a third person.
In a suit to recover the purchase money already paid, the vendee was denied
relief, the court holding in a rather abbreviated opinion that the vendee had com-
mitted a breach of contract, and must therefore suffer the loss.
'Bentley v. Keegan (1921) iog Kan. 762, 202 Pac. 70; Pinkston v. Boyd (19o6)
43 Tex. Civ. App. 568, 97 S. W. 103; Ketchum v. Evertson (i8i6, N. Y.) 13
Johns. 359; Scott v. Merrill (1915) 74 Or. 568, 146 Pac. 99; Hull v. Allen (1911)
84 Kan. 2o7, 113 Pac. l050; Mulcahy v Gagliardo (1919) 39 Calif. App. 458, 179
Pac. 445; Steinbach v. Pettingill (igoi) 67 N. J. L. 36, 5o Atl. 443; Steinhardt .
Baker (19o6) 163 N .Y. 410, 57 N. E. 629. In many cases following the majority
rule only an initial payment has been made, so that the court may adopt either
view.
9 Whitehurst v. Gaskill (1873) 69 N. C. 449; Brobst v. Brock (1870, U. S.) IO
Wall. 519; Weeks v. Baker (189o) 152 Mass. 20, 24 N. E. 9o5. The mortgage is
held to be a mere security for the debt. Gabbert v. Schwartz (i88o) 69 Ind. 450.
0 Wehn v. Fall (1898) 55 Neb. 547, 76 N. W. 13; Siter's Appeal (1856) 26
Pa. 178; Love v. Butler (19oo) 129 Ala. 531. 30 So. 735; Ehrenstrom v. Philips
(I9IO, Del. Ch.) 77 AtI. 81; Lambert v. St. Louis Ry. (19o8) 212 Mo. 692, II
S. W. 55o; Laughlin v. Wis. Lumber Co. (igio, D. Wis.) 176 Fed. 772.
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is the vendee an owner that he is invested with practically all the rights
and obligations of an owner at law. As equitable owner, he is entitled
to any benefit, and must sustain any loss or injury which may accrue to
or befall the property between the execution of the contract and the
time set for the final conveyance." Like other landowners he has power
to devise his interest in such land." It would therefore seem that the
principles applicable to the mortgagor in equity should also be adopted
with respect to the vendee. But many courts *have held otherwise. In
the case of a mortgage, although the legal estate in the mortgage becomes
absolute upon default, yet an equity with respect to the land is recog-
nized as existing in the mortgagor. The court allows the mortgagor to
redeem his property, after the day stipulated, by paying interest in
addition to the debt; and, to avoid hardship, the mortgagee is allowed
at any time after the maturity of the debt to file a bill to foreclose the
mortgagor's right of redemption. The decree of the court will provide
that unless the mortgage be paid with interest within a certain time
specified by the.decree, the mortgagor shall be forever foreclosed (strict'
foreclosure), or, in accordance with "modern practice, that the land be
sold to satisfy the mortgagee's claim, any surplus resulting being given
to the mortgagor.13 Why then should not the vendee, whose status in
equity so nearly approaches that of the mortgagor, be allowed the same
opportunity of redemption?* The'mortgagor is as much a contract
breaker as the vendee, and in the mortgage agreement time is also held
to be of the essence in a court of common law. It seems that since
what has been created in case of an executory contract is in effect an
equitable mortgage, the stipulation therein contained should receive no
more weight than similar provisions in a mortgage.
A few jurisdictions, however, have refused to enforce the contract
literally and have given the vendee relief under conditions of the
same nature as those in the principal case, the courts refusing to
enforce express clauses of forfeiture, or clauses providing that time
shall be of the essence. 14  And in the jurisdictions adopting the majority
'Paine v. Meller (18oi, Ch.) 6 Ves. 349; Manning v. North Brit. Ins. Co.
(1907) 123 Mo. App. 456, 99 S. W. 1O95; Dunn v..Yakish (igoo) io Okla. 388,
61 Pac. 926; Reed v. Lukens (1863) 44 Pa. 2oo; Brakhage v. Tracy (1goo) 13
S. D. 343, 83 N. W. 363; contra, Thompson v. Gould (1838, Mass.) 20 Pick. 134.
"Buck v. Buck (1844, N. Y.) ii Paige, 387; Wimbish v. Montgomery (1881)
69 Ala. 575.
"Kortright v. Cady (i86o) 21 N. Y. 343; I Jones, Mortgages (7th ed. 1915)
secs. 6-11.
' Vernon v. Stephens (1722, Ch.) 2 P. lrins. 66; Richnond v. Robinson (1864)
12 Mich. 193; Brown v. Verzani (1917) 181i Iowa, 237, 164 N. W. 6oi; Barnes
v. Clement (1899) 12 S. D. 27o, 8I N. W. 3oi; Lytle v. Scottish-Anerican Co.
(105o) I22 Ga. 458, 50 S. E. 402; In re Dagenbaum (1873) L. R. 8 Ch. 1022;
Edgerton v. Peckham (1844, N. Y.) ii Paige, 352, 358. "It is only true as a
general proposition that the courts of chancery cannot make new contracts for
parties, but can only enforce them. For the court of equity looks to the substance
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view there is convincing evidence of an attempt to interpret the terms
of the contract as unfavorably as possible toward the vendor. Thus
some courts hold that the vendor by giving notice of his intention to
consider the "contract at an end has in fact rescinded the contract, and
hence, before he can obtain a return of his land, he must put the default-
ing party in statu quo, less such damages as might have been occasioned
by the breach.' 5 Others hold that after the vendee's default, the vendor,
in order to show that he is able and willing to perform, must tender a
deed before he can maintain his action.', Finally in many jurisdictions
the inequitable nature of the rule has given rise to a loose construction
of the doctrine of waiver. As a result the courts construe the slightest
deviation by the vendor from the strict terms of the contract, or the least
sign of leniency shown to the vendee in the matter of tiihe for payment,
as evidence of an intent on the vendor's part not to adhere literally to the
contract.'
7
Perhaps the most satisfactory solution is that adopted by the later
English cases. The courts have there come to the conclusion that
because the parties expressly stipulated that the time should be of the
essence, no specific performance after default need be granted since in
substance this must have been the intention of the parties.' However,
of a contract, and when that is fulfilled, and the general intention of the parties
carried into effect, the court relieves against any forfeiture penalty inserted for
the purpose of enforcing the contract."
"Pierce v. Staub (19o6) 78 Conn. 459, 62 At. 760; Frink v. Thomas (i8gi)
2o Or. 265, 25 Pac. 717; see Three States Lumber Co. v. Bowen (igio) 95 Ark.
529, 129 S. W. -799. Some courts hold that mere notice of default or forfeiture
does not constitute a rescission entitling vendee to a return of payments made
List v. Moore (1912) 2o Calif. App. 616, 129 Pac. 962; Newell v. Stone Co.
(1919) 181 Calif. 385, 184 Pac. 659; Malloy v. Muir (igoi) 62 Neb. 8o, 86 N. W.
916.
" Zeinantz v. Blake (i9o5) 39 Wash. 6, go Pac. 822; Wells Fargo Co. v. Page
(9o5) 48 Or. 74, 82 Pac. 856; O'Connor v. Hughes (1886) 35 Minn. 446, 29
N. W. 152; Reese v. Westfield (909) 56 Wash. 415, 105 Pac. 837; Forsell v.
Carter (1913) 65 Fla. 512, 62 So. 926.
' Three States Lumber Co. v. Bowen, supra note 17; Boone v. Templenman
(i91o) I58 Calif. 29o, 11o Pac. 947; Fox v. Grange (1913) 261 Ill. 116, 103 N. E.
576; Baerenklan v. Peerless Co. (1912) 8o N. J. Eq. 26, 83 Atl. 375; Weaver v.
Griffith (1904) 210 Pa. 13, 59 AtL 315; Turpin v. Beach (igog) 88 Ark. 6D4, 115
S. W. 404; Lancaster v. Roberts (1893) 144 Ill. 213, 33 'N. E. 27; Hill v. Alber
(1913) 261 Ill. I24, 103 N. E. 612; Phillips v. Carver (1898) 99 Wis. 561, 75
N. W. 432; Shorett v. Knudsen (1913) 74 Wash. 448, 133 Pac. 1o29. A stipula-
tion for the payment of interest after maturity is held to amount to a waiver of
the forfeiture. Phillis v. Gross (913) 32 S. D. 438, 143 N. W. 373; Robberson
v. Clark, sutpra note i; contra, Moffett v. Or. & Calif. Ry (905) 46 Or. 443, 8o
Pac. 489. And if the vendor after default acts as if he still considers the agree-
ment in force, he is held to have waived the forfeiture. Mound Mines Co. v.
Hawthorne (19o9, C. C. A. 8th) 173 Fed. 882.
'Steedman v. Drinkle [I916, P. C.] A. C. 275; Cornwall v. Henson (19oo)
2 Ch. 298; In re Dagenbauo, supra note I4; Price v. Ruggles (1917, Manitoba)
28 L, Rep. 132.
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they hold that a stipulation for the forfeiture of all payments previously
made must have been intended in the nature of a penalty. The penalty
would become more severe as fast as the vendee's performance becomes
more nearly complete; the smaller his breach the greater the penalty.
Therefore equity will relieve against such a forfeiture. This is true
even though the parties expressly describe the forfeiture as liquidated
damages. There is in fact no true liquidation or honest estimate, for
the amount stipulated varies in inverse proportion to the loss actually
sustained. Such a result seems to accord fair and equitable treatment
to both parties. It is true that the vendee's legal status is that of a
contract-breaker. He should not be entitled, therefore, to a return of
his purchase money until he has allowed as a deduction therefrom all the
damages caused by his breach, one element of which would be the fair
rental value of the property during the time he occupied it. The law
should not allow one to profit by another's breach, but merely to receive
compensation for the loss sustained.19 When the vendee has paid
damages for the breach and returned the land to the vendor, the latter
is sufficiently recompensed.
Although in general the vendee should be given equitable relief
against a forfeiture, this does not mean that he should always be given
a judgment or decree for a part of his money back. Under the doctrine
of mutuality of remedy, the vendor is entitled to a decree for specific
performance against the vendee.2° Therefore if after default the vendee
seeks relief, the option should be in the vendor to choose whether he
will submit to specific performance of the contract, or to a rescission
thereof accompanied by a repayment to the vendee of so much of the
purchase price already paid as exceeds a fair sum as damages for the
vendee's breach of contract. It is only fair to the vendor to give him
this option, for he is not a contract-breaker and he is the best judge of
the manner in which he can obtain just relief. When it is considered
that in the majority of cases the vendors are large home-building
corporations, or individuals controlling huge tracts divided into home
sites, and that the vendees are frequently persons who do not clearly
comprehend the legal significance of the document (which often contains
printed clauses that are never noticed), the injustice of enforcing a
penalty against the vendee is evident.
EFFECT UPON A PRIOR AND EXISTING WILL OF THE REVOCATION OF A
SUBSEQUENT WILL CONTAINING AN EXPRESS REVOCATORY CLAUSE
In the absence of statute, the destruction, animo revocandi, of a will
" Even at law in a number of American jurisdictions a contract-breaker has
been allowed to recover instalments due him upon a contract Britton v. Turner
(1834) 6 N. H. 481; Woodward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) sec. 174 et seq.
'In equity, if the vendee can have specific performance, the vendor ought also
to be able to obtain it. 5 Pomeroy, Eqzdty (5th ed. 1918) sec. 2169.
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containing a revocatory clause, leaving in existence a prior will, has the
effect of re-establishing the prior will as the last will and testament of
the testator. This principle is old, sound, and logical, but it has long
been obscured by a mass of careless statements in text-books, and ill-
considered dicta in judicial opinions.
One of the causes of this unfortunate clouding of the common-law
rule is an early Connecticut case' which rests squarely upon the funda-
mental and elementary principle that a will is ambulatory. It is poetic
justice that the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut should clear up
the confusion for which it was in part responsible. This it did in the
recent case of Whitehill v. Halbing (1922) 98 Conn.-; 118 Atl.-. In
this case the testatrix executed a will in 1914. A later will, executed in
1919, containing the customary revoking clause, was destroyed by her
with the knowledge that the earlier will was still in existence. After her
death the 1914 will was presented for probate. The contestants claimed
that she had died intestate by reason of the revocation of the 1914 will
by the revocatory clause in the destroyed will. The Probate Court
admitted the 1914 document as her last will and testament. Upon appeal
the Superior Court directed a verdict for the proponent, and the Supreme
Court 2 (Mr. Justice Wheeler dissenting) found no error.
Many writers have dismissed this problem with the statement that
there is a hopeless conflict among the American authorities.3 This, as
later pointed out, seems incorrect, and a few of the text-writers have so
stated.4 Unfortunately, however, some courts have repeated the state-
ment without carefully considering the effect of statutes upon the
problem.5
A careful investigation has failed to disclose any reported case, except
the early Connecticut case above referred to, either in this country or in
England, in which it has been held that the revocation of a will con-
taining a revoking clause laves the estate intestate if the prior will is in
existence at the death of the testator, unless such decision is affected by,
and explainable because of, a controlling statute. The exception, the
aJames v. Marvin (1819) 3 Conn. 576.
The Supreme Court said in part: "Upon these facts the only conclusion which
the jury could reasonably have reached was that the will of igig, with its clause
of revocation, did not immediately and finally take effect to revoke the will of
1914; that when she destroyed the will of 1gig, the testatrix left the will of 1914,
which she was carefully keeping in existence, in force as her will; and that no
other will having been found, the will of 1914 was the only written declaration
relating to the disposition of her property which subsisted at her death."
3i Underhill, Wills (19oo) 367; Page, Wills (1901) 304; Woerner, Law of
Decedents' Estates (1913) 41; Schouler, Wills (5th ed. 1915) 516; I Alexander,
Wills (1917) 755; 1 Jarman, Wills (Bigelow's 6th ed. 1893) 162, note; Powell,
Devises (i8o6) 55; 40 Cyc. 1214; 2-8 R. C. L. 195.
"Thompson, Wills (1916) 42o; i Redfield, Wills (876) 328.
'In re Gould's Will (19oo) 72 Vt. 316, 47 Atl. lo82; Lane v. Hill (1895) 68
N. H. 275, 44 At. 393.
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old Connecticut case of James v. Marvinf,0 was severely criticized by
Redfield,7 and, as the Connecticut Supreme Court has just declared, has
not been the law in Connecticut since 1821.
In England, before 1837, when the Statute of Wills' was enacted,
providing that no will once revoked might be revived except by a re-exe-
cution thereof or by a codicil expressly providing for its revival, there
were two rules: (i) the Ecclesiastical Rule, which sought for and gave
effect to the testator's intention at the time of the revocation of the will
containing the revoking clause;9 and (2) the Common-Law Rule
(known also as Lord Mansfield's Rule), which declared that the first
will was ipso facto re-established upon the revocation of the revoking
will.10
This statute and similar statutes in .the United States are in derogation
of these rules." In those states where no statute affecting this subject
has been enacted, either the Ecclesiastical or the Common-Law Rule
obtains." In many of the states, however, there are statutes which con-
trol. These statutes fall into two classes. Some of them are actual or
substantial re-enactments of the English statute of 1837." Others
provide that a will may be revoked not only by a later will or codicil but
by some "other writing.""'
e Supra note i.
'Redfield, loc. cit.
" (1837) I Vict. c. 26, sec. 22.
9Helyar v. Helyar (1754, Prerog.) i Lee, 472.
'
0 Harwood v. Goodwright (1774, K. B.) i Cowp. 86; Glazier v. Glazier (177o,
K. B.) 4 Burr. 2512.
uRoss v. Woolard (1907) 75 Kan. 383, 89 Pac. 68o.
'Moore v. Rawlett (1915) 269 Ill. 88, io9 N. E. 682; Stetson v. Stetson (i9o3)
2oo Ill 6oi, 66 N. E. 262; Bates v'. Hacking (i9o8) 29 R. I. I, 68 Atl. 622;
Blackett v. Ziegler (1911) 153 Iowa, 344, 133 N. W. gol; Marsh v. Marsh (855)
48 N. C. 77; Taylor v. Taylor (1820, S. C.) 2 Nott & McC. 482; McClure v.
McClure (1887) 86 Tenn. 173, 6 S. W. 44.
"The New York statute is typical of this class: "If after making any will the
testator shall duly make and execute a second will, the destruction, cancelling, or
revocation of such second will shall not revive the first will unless it appear by the
terms of such revocation that it is his intention to revive and give effect to the
first will, or unless .. .. he shall duly republish his first will." N. Y. Cons. Laws,
,9o9, 505. See also Ky. Sts. 1915, ch. 135, sec. 4834; Va. Code, 1919, sec. 5234;
Deering's Calif. Civ. Code, 19,5, sec. 1297; Ga. Code, 1911, sec. 3917; Burns'
Ind. Sts. 1914, sec. 3115; Kan. Gen. Sts. 1915. ch. 126, sec. 11794; Mo. Rev. Sts.
1919, ch. i, sec. 513; Or. Laws, 192o, sec. 10104; Remington's Wash. Comp. Sts.
1922, sec. 1405; S. D. Rev. Code, 1919, sec. 628.
"This type of statute is exemplified in Michigan: "No will.... shalt be
revoked, unless by burning ..... or by some other will or codicil in writing, exe-
cuted as prescribed in this chapter; or by some other writing, signed, attested and
subscribed in the manner provided in this chapter for the execution of a will .. "
Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, ch. 226. sec. 9. See also Tex. Rev. Civ. Sts. 1911, art.
7859; Wis. Sts. 1921, ch. 103, sec. 229o; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, ch. 74, sec. 7256;
Purdon's Pa. Digest, 1910, p. 5130.
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Under the latter class of statutes, some courts have held that since the
revocation of a will may be effected by a non-testamentary document,
merely including the revocatory document in a will does not make that
clause ambulatory.15 Other courts, construing similar statutes, have
declared that when the testator chooses to effect the revocation of a prior
will by a clause in a subsequent will, the revocation, like the rest of the
will, is ambulatory.' The decision in James v. Marvin was justified
by a rule of law, independent of statute, which before 1821 permitted
the revocation of a will in Connecticut, not only by a writing not testa-
mentary, but even by parol. 8
In 1821 was enacted the Connecticut Statute of Wills,'
9 which in
substance has continued in force to this day. By force of this statute
the power to revoke a will by a writing not testamentary in character is
taken away; revocation can be accomplished only by "a later will or
codicil." After the enactment of this statute, James v. Marvin
2 0 ceased
to be the law in Connecticut, and the Supreme Court has so intimated
more than once.
21
15Danley v. Jefferson (19o8) I5O Mich. 590, 114 N. W. 470; Cheever v. North
(1895) io6 Mich. 39o, 64 N. W. 455; In re Cunningham (1888) 38 Minn. I69,
36 N. W. 269; Hairston v. Hairston (885) 30 Miss. 276; Bohanon v. Walcott
(1836, Miss.) i How. 336; In re Noon (19o2) 115 Wis. 299, 91 N. W. 670.
" In re Diament's Estate (1915) 84 N. J. Eq. 135, 92 At. 952; Colvin v. Warford
(1863) 20 Md. 357; Williams v. Miles (19o3) 68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W. 7o5; In re
Gould's Will, supra note 5; Pickens v. Davis (1883) 134 Mass. 252; Williams v.
Williams (1886) 142 Mass. 515, 8 Atl. 424; Lane v. Hill, supra note 5.
1 Supra note i.
'Witter v. Mott (1816) 2 Conn. 67; Card v. Grinnan (1821) 5 Conn. 164.
Hosmer, C. J. said in the case of James v. Marvin, supra note I, at p. 579:
"A deed of revocation separate from a will has the effect of annulling a prior
will, instantaneously; and the operation is the same whether the revoking clause
be in a deed or will; for it is never a necessary part of the latter."
1 Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, ch. 254,- sec. 4946.
"Supra note i.
Fitzpatrick v. Cullinan (1913) 87 Conn. 579, at p. 584, 89 Atl. 92, at p.
94: " .. .. It is therefore unnecessary to determine the question, left undecided in
Peck's Appeal, whether, under our present statute, such a revoking clause would
take effect immediately, so that the subsequent destruction of the second will with
intent to revive the first would be ineffectual without a republication of the first
will." See also Peck's Appeal (1883) 5o Conn. 562; Security Co. v. Snow (1898)
70 Conn. 288, 39 Atl. 153. In the instant case the court said in part: "It would
be difficult to demonstrate logically that an express revocatory clause was not a
legal expression of the testator's intention respecting the disposition of his property
after death, made known through a written declaration, to which the law will
give effect only after his death and execute as his will ..... If this declaration
of intention is not a will, by the terms of statutes no will is revoked by it. If it
is a will, it must have the essential quality of a will which is expressed by the
word ambulatory. Page on Wills, p. 49. 'It is this ambulatory quality which
forms the characteristic of wills.' i Jarman on Wills (6th Ed.) p. 18 .....
"This principle of law was so strongly entrenched in England that a statute
was needed to dislodge it. In 1837, the Parliament decreed that no will or codicil,
nor any part thereof, which shall be in any manner revoked, shall be revived other-
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Although the logic of this decision seems unassailable, the fact that the
legislative trend has been in the other direction may encourage adverse
criticism on the theory that harmony is peculiarly desirable in this field.
The wisdom of the legislation prevailing in this country is, however,
extremely doubtful, for the decisions have not been uniform22 under
the type of statute23 providing for a revocation by some "other writing."
Wills may easily be, and frequently are, executed and later destroyed
in secret. The witnesses to the revoking will would not necessarily know
of the testator's death, and even though they should happen to know
about it, they would not be likely to examine the will offered for probate
and make known that a later will had been executed. Even if there
were rare cases where witnesses whose keen sense of duty would lead
them to do this, whether the second will contained a revocatory clause or
not would still be an open question of fact, since it is infrequent that a
copy of the revoked will is available. Thus, where the rule is that a
revocation by will is instantaneous, it must necessarily frequently happen
that a revoked will is probated merely because the execution of the
subsequent will (later destroyed) is never brought to the attention of
the probate court.
It is clear that the common-law rule is much simpler of application.
The will bearing the latest date having been offered for probate, it may
safely be admitted without the disturbing possibility that the testator
might at some time have revoked that will by a later testament which
was also revoked by burning or tearing. Under this rule it is assumed
as a matter of law, after a thorough search has shown that no later will
is in existence, that the existing document is an expression of the
testator's last desires; under the other rule the legal assumption is
either directly contrary, or the matter is entirely indefinite. Even though
there may be cases in which the existence at the testator's death of the
prior will may be due to accident or oversight, the common-law doctrine
has the merit of stating a definite legal rule which it seems will more
often than not coincide with the testator's desires.
SAMUEL A. PERSKY
New Haven, Connecticut
wise than by a re-execution thereof, or by a codicil executed as required by the Act
and showing an intention to revive the same. i Victoria, Chap. 26, Sec. 22.
This statute in substance has been adopted in many of the United States, including
New York, Indiana, Ohio, Kansas, Missouri and California. The decisions of the
courts of these States are controlled by such legislation, and have therefore no
direct bearing upon the subject of revivor in Connecticut, where no statute has
been enacted. In Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota and Pennsylvania, the statute permits wills to be revoked by 'some
other writing' than a will, if it be executed in the manner provided for the execu-
tion of wills. This, as we have seen, has not been the law of Connecticut since
1821 ..... Decisions which are compelled or conclusively influenced by such
local laws, necessarily have little weight in our courts where no similar law is now
in force."
12 Supra notes 15 and 16. Supra note 14.
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[Note. In an able dissenting opinion received after the above comment had been
printed, Chief Justice Wheeler attempts to demonstrate that James v. Marvin,
supra, "one of the notable contributions of constructive legal reasoning in our
reports," is "established by the overwhelming weight of authority in this country,
judicial and legislative as well." To the point that "Lord Mansfield's rule has been
thoroughly disapproved in this country as well as in England," he cites, inter alia,
Schouler, op. cit. sec. 415, note; COMMENTS (1912) 21 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 672.
He also differs from his associates as to the effect of the Connecticut Statute of
1821. The recent case of In re Tibbetts' Estate (1922, Minn.) i89 N. W. 401, is in
accord with the majority view in the principal case. Ed.]
THE PRIVILEGE OF A PUBLIC UTILITY TO WITHDRAW FROM SERVICE
When private property is "affected with a public interest, it ceases to be
juris privati only."' Land and chattels devoted to the public service
are subject to special rules; property in them is subject to limitations not
existing in the case of purely private ownership. Public servants are
likewise subject to special control; they have fewer privileges and
heavier duties than other persons. Such special burdens and control
may, of course, be made so heavy as to react against the public welfare
and defeat their own ends. Thus a rule absolutely forbidding a public
utility to withdraw from the public service would operate oppressively
and would prevent men from entering such service at all. In particular
is this true where the utility contemplates a partial withdrawal only.
2
When there is no grant from the state, but a mere holding out to
serve the public as in the case of innkeepers3 or common carriers by
wagon,4 it has long been settled that mere cessation of business will con-
'Lord Hale in his treatise De Portibus Maris, I HARaG. LAW TRACrs, 78. "When
one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect,
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the
public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He
may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use." Waite, C. J., in Munn v. Illinois
(1876) 94 U. S. 113, 126.
'Wyman, Public Service Corporations (1911) sec. 290.
3Anonymous (1623) Godbolt, 345, where it was said: "If an Inn-keeper taketh
down his Signe, and yet keepeth a hosterie, an Action upon the Case will lie
against him, if he do deny lodging unto a travailer for his money; but if he taketh
down his Signe, and giveth over the keeping of an Inn, then he is discharged from
giving lodging." In Rex v. Collins (1623) Palmer, 373, it is said that "an inn-
keeper may at his pleasure demolish his sign and leave off innkeeping." And in
Conklin v. Prospect Park Hotel Co. (1888) 48 Hun, 619, I N. Y. Supp. 406, it was
intimated that after a sale of his business an innkeeper would not be under any
further duty.
4Satterlee v. Groat (1828, N. Y.) I Wend. 272. The defendant was a common
carrier by wagon between Schenectady and Albany previous to 1819, but had given
up the business. The court said: "The defendant stood upon the same footing as
though he had never been engaged in the forwarding business. He had abandoned
it entirely."
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stitute withdrawal.-' In some cases, however, there must be reasonable
notice of this intention.0 What constitutes reasonable notice is a ques-
tion of fact in each case to be determined by the character and import-
ance of the business.7
The public has a stronger interest to preserve when special obligations
are assumed by reason of the acceptance of a franchise, and different
results often follow. Such are cases of railroads, trolleys, water, gas,
and electric companies. Three recent decisions concern cases of this
character. In one a street railway, which was operating at a loss with
no prospect of recoupment, was given the privilege of abandoning its
entire service if the city did not remove burdensome paving obligations
imposed by franchise.8 In the second case an electric utility was per-
mitted over the objection of individuals who relied on contract rights, to
discontinue service on an unprofitable line when such discontinuance in
no way interfered with the rest of the general system of the company
In the third case a water company was not permitted to cease operations
because of alleged losses" until there had been a determination as to the
adequacy of the present rates.' °
Similar in character are the decisions recognizing the privilege of a ferryman to
abandon his profession. Carter v. Commonwealth (1823) 2 Va. Cas. 354. Or of
a warehouseman to make his warehouse private. Munn v. Illinois, supra note 2.
Nash v. Page (1882) 8o Ky. 539, acc. In that case the defendants were tobacco
warehousemen and refused to sell to the plaintiffs. They sought to avoid their
legal duty to do so "by the passage of a resolution disclaiming that they were
operating their houses in the capacity of warehousemen, but as commission mer-
chants." The court would not hear them say: "'I am, in fact, a public warehouse-
man for the sale of tobacco, but in name I am a commission merchant.'" The
situation seims analogous to that of the innkeeper who simply takes down his
sign but does not abandon the business. But the case of Glass v. Davis (1873,
Va.) 23 Gratt. 184 is contra to the Nash case and certainly seems to go too far.
Here it was held that the owners of a public warehouse may close it on a certain
day, on' giving reasonable notice, and -open it on the same day as a private ware-
house, where everything except the inspection of tobacco is to be done as in the
public warehouse. That case apparently stands alone.
'Wyman, op. cit. sec. 316, and cases there cited.
"A teamster might withdraw upon a day's notice doubtless, as his patrons may
quickly make other arrangements. A canal boatman might tie up at the end of any
trip, for other opportunities for shippers over the canal are numerous. But a
railroad company may not without long notice abandon its line. And a gas- com-
pany could abandon its service only after a long enough period to provide for a new
supply." Wyman, op. cit. sec. 317, and cases there cited. For decisions by public
service commissions on this point see Re Tidewater & W. Ry. [1917 E.] Pub. Util.
Rep. (Va.) 798; Re Delaware & H: Ry. [1917 A.] Pub. Util. Rep. (N. Y.) 715;
Ex parte Central Illinois Public Service Company [1916 B.] Pub. Util. Rep. (Ill.)
920; New York Trust Co. v..Buffalo & L. C. Trac. Co. (1920, Sup. Ct.) 112 Misc.
414, 183 N. Y. Supp. 278.
"Re City of Sault St. Marie [1922 D.] Pub. Util. Rep. (Mich.) 14,
'Re Idaho Power Co. [1922 C.] Pub. Util. Rep. (Idaho) 705.
o Wiesehan v. Zionsville Water & Elec. Co. [1922 C.] Pub. Util. Rep. (Ind.) 863.
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The rule is well established that in the absence of statute or express
contract a public service corporation may discontinue its entire service
when operations are being carried on at a loss without reasonable promise
of future profit, since otherwise the "due process" clause of the Four-
teenth'Amendment would be violated.1 It follows that there is no
implied contract to continue operation from the mere acceptance of a
charter or the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 12  This rule is
clearly sound, for a rule compelling the relinquishment of private prop-
erty without compensation would not operate for the good of the gen-
eral public.13  The first case' 4 falls clearly within this rule; there being
no mandatory provision in the franchise, the consent of the state was
unnecessary. Whether there can be total abandonment of a solvent road
without the consent of the state raises a different problem. Naturally
the courts have not often passed on such a question, as the owners of
a profitable road do not, as a practical matter, abandon it. The existence
of this privilege depends upon whether the charter under which the util-
ity operates is mandatory or permissive. When the franchise is man-
datory in character, a mandamus will issue to compel the utility to
continue operation;" but when it is permissive no such remedy may be
had. 6
A contract of service with individuals, in contrast with one made with
the state in a franchise, is not to be construed as an impediment to any
action which the company may see fit to take in regard to withdrawal.
"Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Ry. Commission (1919) 251 U. S. 396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183.
In that case the petitioner, operating a railroad in connection with a sawmill, sought
to abandon the railroad because it was unprofitable. The court permitted this
although a profit could be derived from the entire business, saying: "A carrier
cannot be compelled to carry on even a branch of business at a loss, much less the
whole business of carriage." City of Helena z,. Helena Light & Ry. (1922, Mont)
207 Pac. 337. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. N. D. (1914) 236 U. S. 585, 35
Sup. Ct 429; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. W. a. (1914) 236 U. S. 6o5, 35 Sup. Ct 437.
'Bullock v. Florida (1921) 254 U. S. 513, 41 Sup. Ct. 193.
'Erie Ry. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm. (1921) 254 U. S. 394, 41 Sup. Ct. 169;
New York Trust Co. v. Buffalo & Lake Erie Traction Co. (1920, Sup. Ct) 112
Misc. 414, 183 N. Y. Supp. 278; State v. Duluth & M. N. Ry. (1921) 150 Minn.
30, 184 N. W. 186. It has been held also that where the available supply of a
natural gas company is exhausted, the company may withdraw its services' and
facilities. Village of St. Clairsille v. Public Utilities Comm. (1921) 1O2 Ohio St
574, 132 N. E. 15i. See also (1922) 20 MIcH L. REv. 802.
'
4Supra note 8.
'Wyman, op. cit. sec. 30o; Fellows v. Los Angeles (1907) 15, Calif. 52, 9o Pac.
137; Gainesville v. Gas & Elec. Co. (1913) 65 Fla. 404, 62 So. 919; see Southern
Ry. v. Hatchett (1917) 174 Ky. 463, 192 S. W. 694; State v. Postal Telegraph Co.
(1915) 96 Kan. 298, 15o Pac. 544; Colorado & S. Ry. v. Ry. Commission (1913)
54 Colo. 64, 129 Pac. 5o6.
"Wyman, op. cit. sec 296; East Ohio Gas Co. v. Akron (19o9) 8i Ohio St 33,
9o N. E. 40; see _1unm v. Illinois, supra note I; San Antonio Street Ry. v. State
(1897) 9o Tex. 520, 39 S. W. 926.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Hence this point is correctly disposed of in the second case. 1 7  Although
it causes hardship to the individual, this seems to be a necessary rule.18
The question of partial withdrawal, however, as brought out in the
second of the principal cases, is- quite similar to that of total abandon-
ment by a solvent company. As a corollary to the power of the state to
compel an extension of service, although unprofitable, if the venture as
a whole will return a profit, 9 it may grant permission partially to with-
draw from service. According to the better view such discontinuance
is possible only with the permission of the state.20  There are, however,
almost as many cases permitting a partial withdrawal without the consent
of the state, in the absence of mandatory provisions in the charter.
This was the prevailing view until the latter part of the last century;
the usual doctrine being that when the charter was permissive the con-
tinuance of any service was left to the discretion of the company.
21
'
7 Supra note 9.
"An individual can acquire no vested right as against the public in the con-
tinued service of a public utility. Such a doctrine once admitted would destroy the
convenience as a public utility; it would then become hampered and subject to the
control of the individual and made to subserve such interests, to the detriment of
the public welfare." Asher v. Hutchinson Water, L. & P. Co. (19o3) 66 Kan. 496,
500, 71 Pac. 813, 814; CGlte v. Nassau & Suffolk Lighting Co. (1922, Sup. Ct.) 118
Misc. 63o, 195 N. Y. Supp. 84. The rights of the individual to his action on the con-
tract must be determined as an independent matter. It has been held that a contract
in a franchise from a city may not prevent a street railway from going out of busi-
ness when properly authorized to do so by the state. City of Helena v. Helena
Light & Ry., supra note ii.
9 (1918) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 715.
'Wyman, op. cit. secs. 305-3o8, and cases there cited. Southern Ry. v. Hatchett,
supra note 15; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Ry. (x878, C. C. D. Kan.) Fed. Cas.
No. 4666; Brownell v. Old Colony Ry. (1895) 164 Mass. 29, 41 N. E. 1o7; Colorado
& S. Ry. Commission (913) 54 Colo. 64, 129 Pac. 5o6; Mt. Carmel Pub.
Util. & Sew. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1921) 297 Ill. 303, 13o N. E. 693; State
v. Postal Telegraph Co. (,9,5) 96 Kan. 298, 15o Pac. 544.
'Northern Pac. Ry. v. Dustin (1891) 142 U. S. 492, 12 Sup. Ct. 283; San
Antonio Ry. v. State (1897) 9o Tex. 520, 39 S. W. 926; East Ohio Gas Co. v.
Akron (igog) 81 Ohio St 33, 9o N. E. 4o. See I Wyman, op. cit. sec. 306 and
cases there cited. This view is well summarized in the language: "Where the
line of railway, taken as a whole, cannot be profitably maintained; when its opera-
tion, when discreetly and economically managed, is attended with loss, it is difficult
to perceive how a court can, by mandamus or otherwise, compel its operation to be
continued .... It more frequently happens, however, that a part of the line becomes
unprofitable, though the system as a whole may be valuable. In such an event the
court will inquire, first, as to the positive duties imposed by the charter, and compel
their performance by appropriate remedies, while with respect to those duties ....
which have been assumed by the corporation under permissive grants of power,
it will consider all the circumstances of the case, and if upon the facts it shall
appear .. .. that the service .. .. is .. .. reasonably adapted to their (those who
make the complaint) needs, while the performance of the duty would entail a
burden and loss upon the company far in excess of any benefit conferred, the court
will withhold its hands." Sherwood v. Atl. & D. Ry. (1897) 94 Va. 291, 3o6, 26
S. E. 943, 948-
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However justified a utility may be in ceasing operations, it should
not be permitted to d6 so until there has been an adequate investigation.
The public should not be subject to the caprice of the officers of the public
service company. If the utility desires to suspend its operations either
wholly or partially because of alleged unreasonable rates, for example,
such suspension should not be countenanced until there has been a deter-
mination of the adequacy of the rates.22  If the rates are inadequate
they may be raised, but if they are reasonable, inefficient management
may be brought to light and corrected. At all events the company has an
adequate legal remedy, and should be required to continue to render its
service in a proper manner until relieved of its duty by due process of
law.23 This seems to dispose of the last of the principal cases, 2f and it is
submitted that the decision is correct.
In deciding cases of this character, confusion has often resulted from
failure to distinguish between cessation of operation on the one hand and
dismantling the plant on the other.25  While an unprofitable utility may
be permitted to cease its operations, yet the public interest still continues
in it to the extent that the company shall not be allowed to stand in the
way of another company s.eeking to render such service.28  The dis-
mantling of a plant which could well be sold to a new company, is cer-
tainly an action in derogation of the rights of the public. If a utility has
the privilege of withdrawal, it might seem that the privilege of disman-
tling should follow, 2 7 but public policy dictates otherwise.2
Although governmental regulation of business is frequently undesir-
able, yet it is necessary at times to protect the interest of the" public. The
problems of withdrawal and dismantling are peculiarly adapted to control
by the state. Discontinuance of service may be prohibited when it is
subversive of the welfare of the public, or it may be permitted when the
burden is far greater than the benefit of operation. In the case of public
service companies accepting special rights and privileges from the state,
' Gainesville v. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 15.
"Gainesville v. Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 15.
" Supra note IO.
'A recent Arkansas case, however, drew the proper distinction when the court
said: "It does not follow that because we have held that the order of the railroad
commission was arbitrary and oppressive, the railroad company has a right to
take up its rails and dispose of them at its own motion." Rowland v. Saline River
Ry. (1915) 119 Ark. 239, 246, 177 S. W. 896, 899.
-' Re St. Croix Gaslight Co. [1919 A.] Pub. Util. Rep. (Me.) 487.
T Such is certainly the rule in the case of the company ceasing operation by
reason of the expiration of its franchise. Cleveland Rlec. Ry. v. Cleveland
(igo7) 2o4 U. S. 116, .27 Sup. Ct 2o2; Laighton v. City of Carthage (igog,
C. C. D. Mo.) 175 Fed. 145; Gas Co. v. Akron (igo9) 81 Ohio St 33, 90 N. E. 40.
' This view is suggested in Lyon & Hoag v. Ry. Commission (192o) 183
Calif. 145, 146, 19o Pac. 795, 796, where it is said: "The state has no power to
compel the continued operation of a public utility at a loss where the owner of that
utility is willing to and does in fact abandon to the public all its property that has
been devoted to the public use." See NoTEs (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 716, 719.
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cessation of operations should not be tolerated without the consent of
the proper authorities.29
In a recent case before the New York Court of Appeals, the defendant,
superintendent of the law and order department of the New York Civic
League, transmitted to the district attorney a charge that the plaintiff
was engaged in acts of criminal immorality.' This charge, although
made by the defendant as of personal knowledge, was in fact based
solely upon letters received from an unknown correspondent. A major-
ity of the court held that this defamatory charge, although made in
good faith, was not privileged, since the defendant's conduct was so
reckless and wanton as to justify the jury in inferring "malice." The
majority and minority opinions agreed that this occasion was not abso-
lutely privileged 2 and further that the English rule, which holds that an
honest belief in the truth of the matter asserted is sufficient belief to
establish a privilege, should be applied.' The latter doctrine is the rule
in several of the states in this country.4 However, other jurisdictions
require proof of reasonable grounds upon which the alleged honest
belief was based, before the privilege is raised, although the defendant
proves that he published the slanderous words without actual malice. 5
If the defendant had merely turned the anonymous letters over to the
district attorney, there is no doubt but that his act would have been
privileged.
Concerning the procedure in compelling a public utility to perform its obliga-
tions see COMMENTS (I918) 3 CORN. L. QUART. 311, 313.
'Pecue v. West (1922) 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515.
'There is a conflict on this point Matter of Quarles and Butler (1895) 158
U. S. 532, 15 Sup. Ct. 959; see Gabriel v. McMullin (19o5) 127 Iowa, 426, 1O3
N. W. 355 (absolute privilege) ; contra, Miller v. Nuckolls (195o) 77 Ark 64, 91
S. W. 759; Pearce v. Oard (1888) :23 Neb. 828, 37 N. W. 677; 7 Ann. Cas. 113,
note.
'Clark v. Molyneu.x (1877) L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 237; Collins v. Cooper (19o2)
ig T. L. R. 118.
"'It is not essential, in order to invoke the protection of a privileged communica-
tion that the defendant should have had what might seem to the jury to be good
and reasonable grounds for believing that the statements made by him were true;
it is sufficient, if he honestly believed them to be true and made them in good faith
on an occasion of privilege to discharge his duty or to protect his interest." Barry
v. McCullom (19o8) 81 Conn. 293, 7o AtI. 1035; Ely v. Mason (1921) 97 Conn.
38, 115 Atl. 479; Bays v. Hunt (1882) 6o Iowa, 251, 14 N. W. 785; Joseph
v. Baars (igio) 142 Wis. 390, 125 N. W. 913; Hemniens v. Nelson (1893) 138
N. Y. 517, 34 N. E. 342; I. & G. N. Ry. v. Edinundson. (192o, Tex. Com. of
App.) 22:2 S. W. 181; but see Vacicek v. Trojack (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 226
S. W. 505.
'Elns v. Crane (1919) 1i8 Me. 261, 107 AtI. 852; Coogler v. Rhodes (1897)
38 Fla. 240, 21 So. 1O9; Allen v. Pioneer Press Co. (1889) 4o Minn. 117, 41 N. W.
936; Conroy v. Pittsburg Times (18gi-) 139 Pa. 334, 21 AtI. 154; see Hutchins v.
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COMMENTS
Two demands of public policy clash in this situation. The reputation
of the individual, which is really of more value to him than any material
possession" must be protected against false accusations. On the other
hand, it is necessary to the public welfare that criminals be apprehended
and that persons should be encouraged to communicate bona fide charges
of crime to the proper officials. The protection of the reputation of the
individual is of such importance, however, that a rule requiring persons
who report crime to base such charges on grounds which would be
accepted by reasonably prudent men seems not unduly severe. One
who has, through negligence, harmed another should not be permitted to
justify his conduct. This rule would operate to check hasty, negligent
accusations which are of no value in the detection of criminals, and it
would afford the necessary protection to the good name and fame of all
persons.
The result of the instant case is obviously correct, but it is regret-
table that the court went out of its way to reaffirm its approval of the
English rule.
"Who steales my purse, steals trash, tis something, nothing,
Twas mine, tis his, and has bin slave to thousands:
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that, which not inriches him,
And makes me poore indeed."-Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Othello (1622) 46.
